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Abstract While cognitive scientists increase their tenta-
tive incursions in the social domains traditionally reserved
for social scientists, most sociologists and anthropologists
keep decrying those attempts as reductionist or, at least,
irrelevant. In this paper, we argue that collaboration
between social and cognitive sciences is necessary to
understand the impact of the social environment on the
shaping of our mind. More specifically, we dwell on the
cognitive strategies and early-developing deontic expecta-
tions, termed naı̈ve sociology, which enable well-adapted
individuals to constitute, maintain and understand basic
social relationships. In order to specify the way in which
the demanding character of typical social relationships can
be recognized in situ, we introduce the concept of ‘‘deontic
affordances’’. Finally, we shed light on the continuum that
might relate a primitive naı̈ve sociology, dedicated to the
processing of invariant properties of the social life and a
mature naı̈ve sociology, necessary for dealing with the
variable properties of cultural forms of life.
Keywords Cognitive science  Naı̈ve sociology  Deontic
affordances  Social relationships
1 Introduction: Fear of nature
From the perspective of the history of the philosophy of
sciences, the collective resistance that most social scientists
oppose to the so-called ‘‘cognitive revolution’’ is striking.
They deliberately ignore, if not reject, the considerable
body of knowledge with respect to human nature that
cognitive and developmental psychology, neuropsychol-
ogy, neurosciences and evolutionary theory have accumu-
lated during the last decades. The origin of this indifference
can be summed up by Dilthey’s founding distinction
between the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften), built
upon the discoveries of explanatory physical mechanisms,
and the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), driven by
the hermeneutic comprehension of history and culture as
the ‘‘objectifications’’ of the human mind (Dilthey 1883;
Havelange 1998). From this hermeneutical standpoint,
cultural objectifications are assumed to have their own
ontology, in this case a ‘‘historical ontology,’’ based upon
the shared meanings and impersonal rules that constitute
the objective mind of a given community (Hacking 1999).
This objective mind would lie by definition outside, above,
beyond or between the individual minds, in the public
realm of common practices, norms of conduct and reli-
gious, juridical and philosophical representations that make
intelligible any mental and physical activities (Descombes
1996). In short, for most social scientists, the explanation of
human action cannot be grounded in the first nature of the
mind, that is, in the universal mechanisms of information
processing that cognitive science focuses on (Winch 1958;
Durkheim 1912). Sociological explanations of action are
said to be necessarily based upon the second nature of the
mind, that is, the more or less collective principles of acting
that furnish it (Winch 1958; Durkheim 1912; Weber [1904]
1949; Bourdieu 1979; Garfinkel 1967). Even opposite
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sociological paradigms such as methodological individu-
alism and holism tend to agree that the intentional order of
culture must be strongly distinguished from the natural
order of material causes and cerebral mechanisms.1
Such distinction, as well as the fear of reductionism asso-
ciated with biology, has led social scientists to even see
‘‘social relations as a denial of nature’’ (Hirst and Wooley
1982: 22).2
The problem with these dualist views of the relationship
between nature and culture, instinct and sociality, is that
they prevent the development of an ‘‘integrated model of
the study of the human’’ (Schaeffer 2007). For it is pre-
cisely the gap between the human and the animal, cultural
history and biological evolution, that naturalism aims to fill
in. Naturalism aims to harmonize, in the sense of ‘‘making
compatible’’, research done in social science with knowl-
edge accumulated in the natural sciences. Interestingly, the
project of harmonizing social and natural sciences seems
less and less far-fetched thanks to the ‘‘social scientist-
compatible’’ view of cognition that the cognitive sciences
are currently developing. Actually, the study of cognition is
no longer monopolized by the functionalist model of arti-
ficial intelligence that used to depict, in the 1980s, a
‘‘culture-proof’’ cognition, driven by low-level mecha-
nisms impervious to cultural framing or supra-individual
categorization. On the contrary, a growing body of research
in social neuroscience and evolutionary psychology dem-
onstrates the impact of the social environment on the
shaping of our brain. The ‘‘Social Brain Hypothesis’’, in
particular, posits that cognitive abilities of human and non-
human primates are the result of a long process of selection
where enduring environmental constraints played a crucial
role, including social constraints such as social relation-
ships and coalition building (Humphrey 1976; Dunbar
2003). A more human-specific hypothesis, called the
‘‘Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis’’, suggests that the
human mind might even be ‘‘prewired’’ for cultural
learning and knowledge acquisition, particularly that of
conventional symbols, complex tools, and institutional
rules (Tomasello 1999a, b; Herrmann et al. 2007). Despite
these promising, interdisciplinary lines of reflection on our
cognitive inclinations to society and culture, social scien-
tists tend to treat them as irrelevant (Quéré 2011; Ogien
2011).
This isolationist trend can be overcome only if a fruitful
dialogue between social science and cognitive science is
established. To contribute to this dialogue, this paper draws
from research in developmental, comparative, and evolu-
tionary psychology in order to shed light on the invariant
cognitive commonalities that enable social beings to hold
society together. For the social sciences, the fine-grained
account of such cognitive commonalities is of a particular
interest: it enables to open the ‘‘black box’’ of the myste-
rious process of socialization whereby individuals are
supposed to accommodate and assimilate the beliefs, norms
and values of their community.
The paper is structured as follows. In the first part, we
will sum up the main arguments in favor of the domain-
specific organization of our cognitive architecture. After
emphasizing the key role of the social environment in our
natural history, we will dwell on the domain-specific
inferential strategies and early-developing deontic expec-
tations, mostly shared with non-human primates, which
enable well-adapted individuals to cope with their social
surroundings. Following in part Lawrence Hirschfeld’s
proposal (1999, 2001), we will call this set of capacities
‘‘naı̈ve sociology’’. Unlike Hirschfeld, however, we will
not defend a view of ‘‘naı̈ve sociology’’ as a naı̈ve social
psychology, essentially focused on group membership
processing. We will propose a view of naı̈ve sociology as a
more general mode of social relationships processing that
enables human and non-human primates to detect typical
kinds of interactions (inter-actions) and to use them in
order to determine how to behave toward others and what
to expect from them. In the second part of our paper, we
will specify the way social beings recognize the demanding
character of the typical relationships they are confronted
with thanks to the concept of ‘‘deontic affordances’’. As
will be argued, deontic affordances that enable social
perceivers to fore-see what will or should happen next are
the perceptual basis of the deontic inferences that are at the
heart of our relational account of naı̈ve sociology. The third
part of our paper outlines some lines of continuity between
the primitive naı̈ve sociology dedicated to the invariant
properties of the social life and a mature naı̈ve sociology,
necessary for dealing with the variable properties of cul-
tural forms of life. By way of conclusion, we will argue
that research on the prewired set of categorizations and
expectations that enable and constrain the way society can
come to the human mind can be fruitful for both cognitive
and social science. Not only such research would prompt
social scientists to be, at last, realistic about the mental but
1 Of course, the argument of the individualist approaches to the
social, for which the state of society ultimately depends on first-
person conscious, reflexive decisions of individuals, is very different
from the holistic argument according to which there is an irreducible
social reality, both external and constraining (Durkheim 1912). For
individualist sociologists, the problem is that cognitive science unduly
dismantles the rational actor and replaces it with an organism,
conceived as the infra-individual site of the production, conflict and
coalition of mostly unconscious cognitive representations and micro-
mechanisms. In this case, the mistake of the cognitive sciences is not
to neglect the weight of the social but to weaken ‘‘the empire of the
will’’ proper to the individual-as-rational-self (Bronner 2006).
2 The recent, lively French debate that the social naturalism proposed
by Kaufmann and Cordonier (2011) has prompted among sociologists
shows the persistence of this view.
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it would also prompt cognitive scientists to be more real-
istic about the relational and deontic nature of social life.
2 The Cognitive Processing of the Social Domain
It is nowadays widely admitted that the forces of evolution,
and in particular the process of selection, were not exerted
only on our bodies. The minds of evolved organisms, just
like their physiology, are also genetically adapted to their
ancestral environment. At the heart of the cognitive
equipment that complex organisms have evolved is the
capacity to detect particular sorts of relevant information
and to use them to anticipate future events. As the phi-
losopher Daniel Dennett put it, ‘‘a mind is fundamentally
an anticipator, an expectation generator’’ (Dennett 1996:
57).
The recent burgeoning of research blending evolution
with psychology has given rise to interesting hypotheses
about the way organisms have internalized, into their
cognitive architecture, the structural regularities of their
physical and social environment. Many authors have thus
argued that natural selection gives priority to domain-spe-
cific information and learning processing over domain-
general mechanisms, too costly in time and energy (Cos-
mides and Tooby 1994; Sperber et al. 1995; Herrmann
et al. 2007). Domain-specific data processing ensures an
‘‘informational match’’ between the cognitive skills of a
given organism and the problems raised by its environ-
ment, increasing thereby its fitness (Gelman and Williams
1998). At the very least, most cognitive scientists agree that
evolved organisms are inclined to process different kinds
of incoming information in specific ways.
If a degree of domain-specific information processing is
not called into question within cognitive science, the nat-
ure, scope and number of those domain-specific mecha-
nisms are more controversial. Many domain-specific
information-processing systems have been proposed, duly
organized as a function of the properties of the different
kinds of entities that they pick out and the core inferential
principles that support reasoning about them: naı̈ve physics
(physical entities–causal law) (Baillargeon 1987; Spelke
1994), naı̈ve biology (living beings–genetic transmission)
(Atran 1998; Keil 1998), naı̈ve psychology (mental states–
intentional attribution) (Wellman 1990; Baron-Cohen et al.
2000), naı̈ve morality (rules of welfare and justice–ethical
evaluation) (Turiel 1983; Nucci 2001), and naı̈ve arith-
metic (small numbers–quantificational computation)
(Dehaene et al. 1999; Baillargeon and Carey 2012). Those
different domains of information processing have been
revealed in part by developmental psychology, which
shows how children’s knowledge about objects, people and
events expands very rapidly from the very first months of
infancy, including causal expectations that are underde-
termined by experience and impervious to counter-evi-
dence (Hirschfeld and Gelman 1994). Domain-specific
information processing has also been revealed by research
in psychopathology, suggesting for instance that the
developmental disorder of people with autism is charac-
terized by the domain-specific impairment of the ‘‘men-
talizing mechanism’’ necessary to work out what is going
on inside other people’s heads (Baron-Cohen et al. 2000;
Leslie 1991).
Given the importance of the social environment for
humans, the fact that ‘‘naı̈ve sociology’’ has not been
granted much attention compared to the other domain-
specific mechanisms is somewhat surprising. With a few
notable exceptions (Hirschfeld 1995, 1999, 2001; Jack-
endoff 1994, 1999; Cummins 1999), social entities such as
social rules, hierarchies, or groups have rarely been taken
into account as a particular, specific domain of cognition.
One likely reason for this relative indifference is that the
‘‘social’’ domain focused on by most cognitive scientists is
essentially intersubjective and can be processed, as such,
by naı̈ve psychology. In intersubjective interactions,
indeed, the mental states of others, whether they be
intentions, knowledge, beliefs, or desires, are particularly
relevant. As Harris (2006) points out, activities of con-
versation feed on the discrepancies in perspective and
belief and on the exchange of viewpoints differences. The
intersubjective framing of the social domain has thus led
cognitive scientists to account for social cognition in
mentalistic terms. In developmental and comparative psy-
chology, as well as in psychopathology and social neuro-
science, the ability to read the minds and thoughts of
conspecific—the so-called Theory of Mind—is said to be
the primary, pervasive way of interacting appropriately
with others (Astington 2004; Spaulding 2010). This
extensive view of mentalizing as the essential way of
navigating the social world is precisely what the hypothesis
of ‘‘naı̈ve sociology’’ as another foundational domain of
social cognition aims to call into question.
2.1 Revisiting Social Cognition
The mentalistic cast of social cognition within cognitive
science has been challenged by the anthropologist Law-
rence Hirschfeld, who proposed the existence of a specific
social faculty that he coined ‘‘naı̈ve sociology’’ (Hirschfeld
1995, 1999, 2006). For him, this faculty refers to the
capacity to rapidly detect affiliations and memberships, and
to reason in terms of discrete ‘‘human kinds’’, that is,
groups and social categories like race, gender, caste, kin-
ship or social occupations (Hirschfeld 2001). For instance,
when confronted with someone who violates the expecta-
tions linked to a given situation (e.g., driving on the
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freeway), people do not seek out the possible beliefs of the
driver causing the violation. Rather, they draw on
assumptions and stereotypes about the driver’s social
position (e.g., women drivers who do not master the req-
uisite skills, Republican drivers in their big Hummer who
do not believe that they are bound by traffic rules, etc.)
(Hirschfeld 2006). Ultimately grounded in the categorical
thinking that social psychology emphasizes, naı̈ve sociol-
ogy would thus be dedicated to the processing of the group-
level, socially relevant traits that allow social perceivers to
identify what kind of people they are dealing with and to
take such group-level identification as a basis for inference,
prediction and action (Hirschfeld 1999; Hirschfeld and
Gelman 1994).
Different lines of research confirm Hirschfeld’s
emphasis on the cognitive strategies that allow adults and
children to process group membership, allegiance and
social coalitions. For instance, Social Exchange Theory
advocated by Cosmides et al. (2003) assumes the existence
of a mandatory but flexible capacity for reasoning about
shifting alliances and social exchanges, mainly thanks to
coalitional categorization, expected reciprocation and
cheater detection (Kurzban et al. 2001; Cosmides et al.
2005). In a new, fast developing domain of research, sev-
eral developmental psychologists reveal children’s pro-
clivities for parsing the social world into groups. Indeed
preschoolers show abstract expectations about how group
members relate to one another and use social categories as
an inductively powerful means of predicting other’s
behavior (Diesendruck and Eldror 2011; Kurzban et al.
2001; Rhodes 2012; Shutts et al. 2011). In particular,
preschoolers have a strong preference for the individuals
who are similar to themselves, showing thereby a preco-
cious emerging of implicit preferences for in-groups and
hence an early division between ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them’’ (Dun-
ham et al. 2008 Kinzler and Spelke 2011). Also drawing
from the rich and longstanding literature in social psy-
chology, Spelke and Kinzler 2007 suggest that group
membership might be a conceptual primitive. Apart from
the four more established core systems ‘‘that stand at the
foundation of our beliefs and values’’ (objects, agents,
number and space), there would be a fifth core system.
‘‘Such fifth system serves to identify members of one’s
own social group in relation to members of other groups,
and to guide social interactions with in- and out-group
members’’ (Spelke and Kinzler 2007: 257).
Although group membership has certainly a key role to
play in the non-mentalistic dimension of social cognition,
one can wonder what exactly is the conceptual primitive at
stake. Indeed, group membership is by definition a social
relationship that restrains and enables the way group
members relate and should relate to one another. From a
theoretical point of view, seeing group membership as a
type of primitive social relationship rather than a category-
based perception of persons has an important consequence.
It enables to draw attention to other relational primitives
that have been mostly left aside by developmental psy-
chology, comparative psychology and cognitive anthro-
pology: exchange, cooperation, but also competition and
dominance.3 Our hypothesis is then along the same lines as
‘‘the relational models theory’’ that was forcefully proposed
by Alain Fiske years ago on the basis of inter-cultural eth-
nographic fieldwork and experimental studies. To Fiske,
humans have representations of foundational patterns of
social relationships that enable them to generate social
action and to make sense of others’ social behavior, namely
‘‘authority ranking’’ (e.g., people attend to their positions in
a linear ordering), ‘‘equality matching’’ (e.g., people keep
track of the imbalances among them), ‘‘communal sharing’’
(e.g., people treat all members of a category as equivalent),
and ‘‘market pricing’’ (e.g., people orient to ratio values)
(Fiske 1992, 1994; Haslam and Fiske 2004). Compared to
Fiske’s relational theory, our naı̈ve sociology hypothesis
puts more emphasis on domain-specificity and leaves still
open the range of rudimentary social relationships suscep-
tible to be rapidly cognized, in particular by non human
primates and young children. It is not sure, for instance, that
market pricing, which seems more adjusted to a human and
possibly adult way of reasoning, is mastered as early as the
other relational patterns. But our overall hypothesis goes in
the same direction as relational models theory: humans and
possibly primates have representations of abstract types of
social relations and ways of recognizing them in the social
world. Those elementary types of relationships would be
neither lexicalized, nor consciously cognized as such, but
would contain universal features capable of specifying, both
singly and in combination, outward forms of social rela-
tionships with minimal cognitive processing (Fiske and
Fiske 2007; Jackendoff 2007). As Thomsen and Carey
(2013) have recently emphasized, those core concepts of
relationships would thus be part of a relatively small innate
repertoire of abstract relational patterns that would enable
us to recognize their realization in particular cultural
relationships.
To illustrate this relational hypothesis, let us take the
case of dominance, conceived here as an asymmetric dyadic
relationship that establishes who has priority access to
various physical or social resources (Hawley 1999; Watts
2010). A growing body of research suggests that the
capacity of recognizing the relational pattern of dominance
3 In guise of example, in the excellent, voluminous overview of child
psychology recently published by Banaji and Gelman (2013), there
are only two pages about dominance and it is not an entry in the
index. To our knowledge, only two experimental studies have been
published in developmental psychology on dominance processing,
namely Mascaro and Csibra (2012) and Thomsen et al. (2011).
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and using it as a basis for inference and action is innate and
partly shared with non-human species. Numerous studies
indeed show that dominance cues are easily recognized and
have a strong inductive potential in animal species. For
instance, male bonnet macaques use dominance rank to
assess which potential allies are likely to be effective in
coalitions against their opponents (Silk 1999), Pinyon jays
use transitive inference to predict social dominance (Paz-y-
Miño et al. 2004), and even fish gather status information
from observing conspecifics interactions (Grosenick et al.
2007). Recent studies demonstrate that those recognitional
and inferential capacities appear very precociously in
human species. Infants as young as 15-month-old show a
strong sensitivity to third-party asymmetric relationships
that they expect to remain stable from one conflict (e.g., the
dominant agent repeatedly pushes the subordinate so as to
monopolize a given area) to another conflict (e.g., the two
agents competing over a desired resource) (Mascaro and
Csibra 2012). Other studies show that 9- and 10-month-old
infants expect small agents to bow and prostrate in subor-
dination to others of more formidable physical size
(Thomsen et al. 2011). Recent developmental studies reveal
that dominance expectations are cross-situational: 3 year-
old children predict that a dominant who has imposed his
choice on another will then exhibit higher competence in
no-related games and will have more resources than the
subordinate (Charafeddine et al. submitted). Such experi-
mental demonstrations of early dominance processing
confirm previous studies that have used natural observation
and ethological analysis to reveal the sophisticated ways in
which preschoolers use dominance to create political
alignments and group coalitions (Strayer and Strayer 1976).
Taken together, these different studies suggest that
dominance, even if it varies within and between species,
from leadership-like assertiveness to hostile and aggressive
control, has a ‘‘deep structure’’ that remains essentially the
same (Hawley 1999). The fact that this deep relational
structure is identified and used very early in ontogeny and
phylogeny suggests that dominance processing might be an
important part of the relationship-based naı̈ve sociology
that we hypothesize here. Of course, it is necessary to
distinguish between a basic naı̈ve sociology as a core
system and its transformation, when it undergoes devel-
opment, into a mature naı̈ve sociology. While basic naı̈ve
sociology would enable to parse the elementary forms of
dominance, also present in non-humans, mature naı̈ve
sociology would enable to process their context-relative
significance as well as their more subtle and culture-
dependent variations, such as charisma or prestige.
Although dominance or what Fiske and colleagues call
‘‘Authority Ranking’’ is available to all humans as a model
for organizing their surroundings, cultures indeed differ in
how positions in hierarchy are ascribed or achieved,
enduring or transitory, and how they depend on coercion
or, on the contrary, on personal merit, competency and
ability (Fiske 2005; Haslam 2004).
3 Fleshing Out ‘‘Naı̈ve Sociology’’
While drawing significantly from Hirschfeld’s view, our
account of naı̈ve sociology gives it a relational twist.
Instead of being a kind of naı̈ve social psychology that
targets individuals as group members, the target domain of
naı̈ve sociology, we claim, would consist in elementary
types of social relationships—including, of course, the
relationship of affiliation (i.e., group membership).
Hypothesizing different types of social relationships as
fundamental social units permits making an important
distinction between naı̈ve psychology and naı̈ve sociology.
The ontological primitive of both naı̈ve psychology and
naı̈ve sociology understood as naı̈ve social psychology is
the person, whether as a seat of personal dispositions and
attributes or as a seat of category-based stereotypes or
group-level properties. By contrast, the ontological primi-
tive of the naı̈ve sociology hypothesized here is social
relationships, or basic patterns of interaction. Although
research is needed in developmental psychology and
comparative psychology to specify those basic relational
frames, one can assume without too much risk that they
most likely include the following types of relations: group
membership or affiliation as relation of inclusion (A affil-
iates oneself with a group G), dominance as an asymmetric
relation (A imposes her desire on B), exchange as a sym-
metric, reciprocal relation (A gives x to B in return for y),
and possibly nurturance as a positive relation of depen-
dency (A provides care and attention to B).
To sum up the argument that we have made so far, it
seems that naı̈ve sociology might well constitute a specific
domain of its own. Just as the other domains are organized
around a set of basic principles serving to identify the
relevant entities of a given domain and to reason about
these entities (Carey and Spelke 1996), naı̈ve sociology is
characterized by a coherent set of foundational concepts
and core principles. Indeed, naı̈ve sociology satisfies one of
the main conditions of the functioning of our learning
systems, namely the ‘‘conceptual parsing’’ of the world that
Spelke (1994) speaks of. By operating the relational
parsing of our social environment, naı̈ve sociology enables
us to see interactions as instantiations of competition,
cooperation, or dominance and then others as allies or foes,
superiors, inferiors or equals, givers or beneficiaries, and so
on. Moreover, social relationships are governed by a core
principle that might well be, as we will go on to argue, of a
deontic nature. This core principle of social relationships is
deontic because they are by definition patterned
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interactions: they allow social beings to expect that each
time that the action A occurs, the re-action B should
appropriately follow; and that whenever the action B
occurs, it should have been preceded by the action A. For
instance, the action of ‘‘giving an order’’ should be fol-
lowed by the action of ‘‘obeying’’, the two sequences
instantiating together a dominance relationship. The core
principle that guides the way individuals reason about
social relationships is deontic in the sense that it enables
them to expect, in a relational-specific way, what should
happen next. Thus affiliative relationships involve a
deontic principle of mutual cooperation and assistance that
raises normative expectations. These expectations appear
surprisingly early in ontogeny; children as young as
26 months of age expect someone in distress to be helped
by a ‘‘friend’’ rather than by a stranger (Beier et al. 2010).
The main systems of core knowledge such as knowledge
of objects and their motions, or knowledge of agents and
their goal-directed actions, have been proven to be present
in humans but also in other animals, especially primates
(Spelke et al. 2013). Given the ability of non-human pri-
mates to navigate third-party relationships, such as domi-
nance, kinship, and group membership (Cheney and
Seyfarth 2007), one can reasonably hypothesize that they
have also at their disposal a naı̈ve sociology. But such
hypothesis is sustainable only if the deontic principle that
we assume to be at the heart of social relationships moni-
toring is within the cognitive reach of young infants and
non-human primates. Although studies on this topic are
surprisingly scarce, recent research do provide evidence of
elementary norms in other species. Thus chimpanzees
show primitive expectations about the way others, for
instance infants, should be treated. Far from being only
based upon statistical regularities, those expectations have
a deontic dimension, as revealed by the strong reactions
elicited by their violation: conspecifics use third-party
intervention and policing to reinforce the tolerance that
adults are supposed to exhibit towards infants (Rudolf von
Rohr et al. 2011). Other studies show that juvenile chim-
panzees perceive prescriptive social rules concerning the
intensity and noise expected when playing and use these to
regulate their signaling behavior in play contexts (Flack
et al. 2004). Deontic expectations in non-human primates
are all the more likely as they do not necessarily involve
the metarepresentational capacity to follow a norm or to
have a theory of mind. Deontic expectations might rely on
a more rudimentary cognitive mechanism, that is, the ele-
mentary sense of appropriateness of such and such
behavior (e.g., protecting infants, obeying a dominant, etc.)
(Andrews 2009). Such ‘‘sense of appropriateness’’ does not
require the antecedent grasp of a norm determining which
response is correct or incorrect; it can merely be a sense of
‘‘primitive normativity’’ already present, as such, in human
infancy as well as in other non-human species (Ginsborg
2011; Sultanescu and Andrews 2013).
This being said, the way this minimal sense of norm-
ativity might appear in the eye of the beholder remains
mostly obscure. Saying that the interactional norm of
responding by action B to action A appears in the form of
what is appropriate to do within a given type of relationship
is far from sufficient. Concretely, how might the deontic
force of social relationships be cognitively grasped without
too complex cognitive processing? To start answering this
question, we need to carefully distinguish, as the primatol-
ogist Robert Hinde (1976) suggested 40 years ago, two
levels of social iteraction. The more abstract level is the level
of relationships that we have emphasized until now, that is,
the ‘‘patterning of interactions’’ resulting from the process of
abstraction that both human and non human primates are
capable of (Hinde 1976). Such ‘‘relationships mapping’’
allows individuals to specify what kind of action they are
doing together (e.g., exchanging, dominating, cooperating,
etc.). The less abstract level, Hinde says, is the level of the
real-life, ‘‘concrete interactions’’ that are nothing but the
instantiations of the abstract social relationships mentioned
above: instances of exchanging (e.g., food-for-grooming),
dominating (e.g., chasing a competitor), cooperating (e.g.,
caring for the kid of another female) and so on.
Once established the difference between these two levels
of social relationships and cognitive abstraction, it is easier
to better specify how the deontic force of situated interac-
tions might be processed by individual minds. Our
hypothesis is that interactions appear to social perceivers as
a succession of affordances, each action affording a set of
possible subsequent actions. In contrast with the standard
affordance theory, we will contend that interactions do not
only offer certain opportunities for action or reaction; they
constrain the range of appropriate responses. This is pre-
cisely to account for this constraining character that we will
use the concept of ‘‘deontic affordance’’, notably proposed
by Carassa and Colombetti (2009). While remaining
‘‘cognitively parsimonious’’, the concept of ‘‘deontic af-
fordance’’ provides a better understanding of how primitive
normativity might be actually achieved and exploited in real
interactions. This is what the next section aims to show.
3.1 The Deontic Force of Social Affordances
Initially, affordances have been conceived as opportunities
for action offered by the environment to an organism
(graspability, sit-on-ability, etc.). According to Gibson and
contemporary ecological psychologists, affordances are
relational properties: they are derived from the ecological
relationship of interdependency between the behavioral
and cognitive capacities of a given organism and the
objective properties of its environment (Gibson 1979;
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Stavros Valenti and Gold 1991; Good 2007). This coupling
is grounded in the long-term attunement proper to evolu-
tion: given the needs of a particular species, its hard-wiring
is likely to have evolved in a direction that simplifies
picking up the necessary information and parsing the
environment in a specific way (Sanders 1997). For
instance, worms are perceived as edible for birds but not
for horses. The coupling between an organism and its
environment is also grounded in the short-term attunement
proper to situated actions: the structure of material objects
creates new environmental properties that in turn provide
organisms with an additional range of possible actions, for
instance the ‘‘weaponability’’ of a branch (Schmidt 2007).
To put it otherwise, the concept of affordances emphasizes
the way in which the perceptual and actional system of
fine-tuned organisms resonates with the properties of their
environment—an environment that appears to them as a
field of practice, a ‘‘taskcape’’ (Ingold 2001).
Most importantly, affordances are not restricted to sit-
uations coupling material objects to a given range of
actions. Far from being limited to the physical features of a
‘‘body-scale’’ environment, affordances refer to what an
organism ‘‘can do’’ in an environment that can be seen as
an entire realm of potential action (Heft 1989). This means
that the social environment also provides a rich and very
elaborated set of affordances, including the mutual and
reciprocal affordances that individuals represent for one
another. ‘‘Sexual behavior, nurturing behavior, fighting
behavior, cooperative behavior, economic behavior, polit-
ical behavior—all depend on the perceiving of what
another person or other persons afford, or sometimes on the
misperceiving of it’’ (Gibson 1979: 135). Since, as Gibson
put it, behavior affords behavior, social interactions do
provide a whole range of affordances: aggressive behavior
affords defensive reaction, gift affords cooperation, and kin
in distress affords help. By analogy to the ‘‘demand char-
acter’’ of objects that Koffka (1935: 7) spoke of a long time
ago, such as the fruit saying ‘‘eat me’’ or the water saying
‘‘drink me’’, social entities have also a ‘‘demand charac-
ter’’: typical social actions and interactions afford specific
kinds of responses. It is the ‘‘demand’’ aspect of dominance
posture that affords submissiveness and it is the ‘‘demand’’
aspect of defenseless features of infants that afford toler-
ance and protection. Since they invite or even demand to
act, social affordances differ in an important respect from
traditional physical affordances: far from being only action
possibilities or opportunities for action, they have a
directive force and hence a deontic dimension. In other
words, social affordances are ‘‘deontic affordances’’: not
only they indicate ‘‘what I can do,’’ but also ‘‘what I should
do’’ (Carassa and Colombetti 2009; Dokic 2010). If we see
an infant being molested by a grown-up, then we imme-
diately ‘‘see’’ that we should rescue him. In short, social
affordances are not only enabling but also constraining.
For example, the ‘‘act of giving’’ calls for a certain social
response, as shown in capuchin monkeys’ reciprocal
exchanges of food-for-grooming, also known as tit-for-tat:
‘‘you have given me food, then I should give you some-
thing in exchange’’ (Tiddi et al. 2011).
Thus deontic affordances have two important properties.
First, they refer to observable, shared, public opportunities
for perception and action. Although affordances are per-
ceivable from different perspectives and that they might
not be perceived or attended to, they do not fluctuate in
function of the need of the perceiver: they are objective and
shareable features of the environment (Gibson 1979: 139).
In other words, even if affordances are not perceptually
manifest in the way that colors and shapes are, they are
nevertheless immediately and commonly recognizable by
all the animal of a species or, at least, by all the members of
a given community. Unlike mental states, generally char-
acterized as internal, hidden, and unobservable properties
of minds, deontic affordances are entirely out there, in the
open, to be perceived. If we see, for example, a smiling
person lifting a piece of bread toward someone else, we
know that this person is offering food and that such
offering gesture affords an attitude of gratitude. Second,
the recognition of deontic affordances is quasi-immediate:
a facial expression of intimidation affords the action of
complying, and a threatening face affords the action of
fleeing. In short, deontic affordances allow individuals,
including those who are deprived of metarepresentational
capacities (e.g., infants, non-human primates), to foresee
what is the appropriate way to respond to such and such
behavior without resorting to explicit norms.
Examples of deontic affordances in the non-human
social world are numerous. For instance, chimpanzees
facing request gestures from conspecifics are prone to share
food, showing thereby that the behaviors that are recog-
nized as requests afford or elicit pro-social responses
(Yamamoto et al. 2009; Melis et al. 2011). Along the same
lines, monkeys exhibit soliciting gestures that signal to the
potential groomed that they want to start a grooming
interaction (Matsuzawa 2008). It is worth noting that
sophisticated deontic affordances are not only present in
primates; indeed, in coyotes, wolves and dogs, play signals
such as play bow or self-handicapping afford non-aggres-
sive action and inhibit ‘‘serious’’ actions such as biting or
scratching (Bateson 1972; Bekoff and Beyers 1998).
Thanks to these examples of deontic affordances, it
becomes easier to see how it is possible to have ‘‘primitive
normativity’’ in the animal and human realms. Such
normativity is constitutive of the chain of actions and re-
actions that makes certain behaviors not only possible but
also appropriate: the action of A solicits a certain response
that B, in turn, feels obligated to favor. These mutual
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solicitations, proper to social life, do not need a complex
cognitive processing to be recognized and acted upon.
Since action possibilities that are appropriate to enact are
perceivable, their processing do not require meta-repre-
sentational abilities. Just as individuals perceive that fruits
make eating possible, they might readily perceive the
deontic requirements that specific situations impose on
behavior.4 In other words, the account of primitive norm-
ativity in terms of affordances that we defend here assumes
that normative demands on action are not rules of conduct
per se and, therefore, do not require a rule-following
behavior whose presence in non-human societies as well as
in early childhood is very unlikely. Normative demands are
inherent in the course of interactions and are graspable
under the form of what is the right, appropriate thing to do
in such or such ‘‘affording’’ situation.
3.2 From Social Affordances to Naı̈ve Sociology
We have seen above that an essential characteristic of
social affordances is that they encapsulate a deontic force:
they have a normative component that incites those who
participate in a concrete interaction to act in a certain way.
We will now argue that this normative aspect of concrete
social interactions is the basis for a full-fledged naı̈ve
sociology, that is, a theory-like system that takes social
relationships as input and forms expectations and infer-
ences on their basis. Two aspects need to be specified for
establishing how individuals can recruit such system of
social inferences, even when they are not personally
involved in a given interaction. Firstly, we have to insist on
the fact that affordances are not only egocentric (i.e., a
given feature of the environment affords the agent to act in
a certain way) but also, if not mostly, allocentric (i.e., an
observed social interaction enables an external observer to
fore-see what will or should happen next). Secondly, we
have to explain how expectancies based on the perception
of concrete social interactions can be represented at a more
abstract level, thereby allowing perceivers to draw infer-
ences about the nature of a social relationship even in the
absence of the main characters.
Arguably, affordances have been mostly thought of in
the first person, delimiting what I perceive in my environ-
ment as opportunities or calls for actions, including the
potential actions of others present in my own space and
hence within my reach (Dezecache et al. 2013). But it is
important to note that the inviting character of affordances
can also be seen from the outside, that is, from the third-
person point of view of a detached observer. Indeed, several
researchers, including Gibson himself, have rightly pointed
out that we do not only perceive affordances egocentrically;
we can also see affordances allocentrically by focusing on
another agent’s practical abilities, opportunities and incli-
nations (Zaehle et al. 2006; Dokic 2010). From a cognitive
point of view, allocentric perception of affordances is
slightly more complex. Indeed, when we perceive an af-
fordance from a first-person perspective (e.g., the reach-
ability of an apple), our self does not have to be a
component of our visual field. On the other hand, in the case
of allocentric perception of affordances, we need to repre-
sent explicitly the relevant agent as well as his relationship
with his environment—including the other individuals he is
interacting with (Dokic 2010). Let us take the example of a
social perceiver facing an ongoing interaction between two
people, say Marc and Maurice; thanks to asymmetry display
and status signaling, the perceiver detects a relational
asymmetry that leads him to expect congruent conducts; he
or she would be very surprised, for instance, to see Marc,
who seems to be the boss, showing ostensive marks of
respect (e.g., bowing, kneeling, etc.) for Maurice.
Interestingly, such allocentric perception of deontic af-
fordances is also present in non-human primates. For
instance, when a juvenile vervet monkey’s scream is
played from a concealed loudspeaker to three adult
females, two of them look at the mother and seem to expect
her to respond (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990). In other words,
the adult females see the juvenile’s scream as affording a
caring behavior from his mother (deontic affordance) and
expect the mother to act accordingly. The perspectival
endorsement that affordances involve is thus far from
restricted to the egocentric perception of objects; on the
contrary, it includes the allocentric perception of social
interactions in which others are ‘‘caught in’’.
Once seen the extended perspectival endorsement
proper to affordances, it remains to determine which kind
of supplementary ability is needed to generalize judgments
of relationships, established on the basis of the affordances
available in a given interaction, to another course of
(inter)action. This supplementary ability is precisely what
naı̈ve sociology, as a naı̈ve theory, is about: a system of
inferences that enable social agents to extract abstract
relational features from ongoing interactions and to orga-
nize them into core knowledge applicable to novel situa-
tions. In Marc and Maurice’s example, observers can
recruit what they know about the relationship between
Marc and Maurice to infer what they should do in a new
situation (e.g., making a decision, sharing food, taking the
lead in an expedition, etc.). As complex as it may seem, the
premises of such inferential ability exist in non-human
primates. Indeed monkeys are able to generalize
4 Although not resorting to the concept of affordance, several authors
have argued arguing in favor of the perceptibility of deontic facts. For
them, moral evaluation is not based upon conformity with rules of
conduct, but upon sensitivity to deontic requirements that specific
situations impose on behavior. See notably Mac Dowell (1978) and
Goldie (2007).
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categorical judgments of dominance, inferred from the
observation of a kind of interaction between unknown
same-looking conspecifics (e.g., a monkey chasing
another), to another kind of interaction (e.g., monkeys
fighting) (Bovet and Washburn 2003). Monkeys are also
able to redirect aggression against a close relative of a prior
opponent, revealing a capacity for abstracting an underly-
ing kinship relationship from a series of third-party inter-
actions in which they are not personally involved (Cheney
and Seyfarth 1990). Other studies show that chimpanzees
draw inferences about the nature of an interaction they
could not see: they react strongly when they hear, without
any visual contact, a subordinate producing aggressor
screams towards a dominant, showing thereby that they
have abstract relationship-based expectancies (Slocombe
et al. 2010). Deontic inferences are also generated by the
relationship of group membership. For instance, members
of a troop of rhesus monkeys are expected to utter the call
to share food and those who do not comply are punished
(Hauser and Marler 1993). On the other hand, non-mem-
bers of the troop are not punished if they do not utter the
call for food, revealing deontic expectations such as ‘‘if
you are a member of my group, all else being equal, then
I’ll cooperate with you and I’ll expect the same from you’’
(Jackendoff 1992, 1999). This kind of relational expecta-
tions does involve deontic inferences. Indeed, as Mercier
and Sperber (2009) rightly remind it, an expectation, is
‘‘the outcome of an inference’’, typically drawn in an
unconscious manner. From an evolutionary perspective,
this inferential capacity is an important cognitive step that
brings adaptive advantages: it enables agents to reason on
the abstract level of social relationships and hence to go
‘‘beyond the information given’’ (Bruner and Anglin 1974).
The two-layer processing involved in naı̈ve sociology
can thus be laid out as follows:
To get back to Hinde’s distinction, deontic affordances
manifest the demanding character of this specific interac-
tion (e.g., the dominant x requires food from subordinate
y, then y complies) whereas more abstract deontic prin-
ciples would govern the types of social relationships (e.g.,
if x is in a relation of dominance, then x should perform
actions a, b, c, etc.). It is at this abstract level of social
relationships that naı̈ve sociology comes into play: it
enables agents to go beyond the recognition of deontic
affordances available in the here and now of a concrete,
singular chain of interactions and to recruit more abstract
deontic expectations to generate predictions about new
situations. In other words, social relationships are the
conceptual primitives of naı̈ve sociology; as for the core
inferential principle that supports reasoning about them, it
is, from both egocentric and allocentric perspectives, of a
deontic nature. Such deontic principles lead social agents
to expect that two individuals engaged in a certain type of
relationship at time tn should and will act accordingly at
time tn?1. For instance, two people engaged in a friendly
relationship at t0 will be expected to share food or help
each other at t1. If the course of interactions unfolded in a
different way, observers would be very surprised or, at
least, they would show greater orientation responses, as is
the case with chimpanzees confronted to situations where
rules of directionality are violated and signals are not
congruent with existing social relations (Slocombe et al.
2010). For humans, one can even suppose that it is pre-
cisely in such expectation violation situations that theory
of mind is preferentially activated. A psychological
inquiry into the hidden beliefs or intentions of the social
partner who did not behave the way he was supposed to
seems indeed necessary to pinpoint the individual-level
reasons for this puzzling relational discrepancy (Clément
et al. 2011).
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4 From Social to Cultural Relationships
One issue raised by our naı̈ve sociology hypothesis con-
cerns its application for human societies. Although one can
easily admit that elementary types of social relationships
do play a central role in non-human societies, one might
question their relevance for human-specific and hence
cultural forms of life. If, as Bloch (2008) put it, the very
foundation of the sociality of humans is the capacity to
imagine a ‘‘transcendental network’’ beyond their ‘‘imme-
diate social circle’’, including the dead, ancestors and gods,
the way such extended sociality can be processed by naı̈ve
sociology seems rather mysterious. Indeed our affordance-
based model of naı̈ve sociology starts from the saliency of
information laid out in the environment, making it seem-
ingly difficult to account for the ‘‘detached representa-
tions’’, proper to culture, which stand for objects or events
that are neither present in the situation nor triggered by
some recent situation (Gärdenfors 1996). In other words,
since cultural representations deal mostly with things that
are non perceptible, if not non-existent—whether absent
people, future or hypothetical events, fictional entities or
counterfactual goals (Harris 2000), what might be the
usefulness of a cognitive processing ultimately grounded in
the perceivable demanding character of interactions?
To answer this important question, the relational model
theory proposed by Fiske (1992, 2005) is again useful: to
him, basic social relationships take culture-specific forms
of implementation and realization that children and adults
coming into a new culture have to recognize and learn in
order to behave in a culturally appropriate manner. If we
redescribe this proposal within our framework, this means
that basic social relationships constitute a core system over
which each particular culture builds its own flesh: each
cultural relationship would ultimately instantiate, including
with supernatural beings, a basic social relationship, whe-
ther it be dominance, group membership, nurturance,
cooperation, competition, or exchange.
It is worth noting that assuming that cultural types of
relationships ultimately ‘‘piggyback’’ on basic types of
social relationships does not diminish the intrinsic force of
culture. By definition, culture creates new opportunities
and invitations to act, but this creativity does not neces-
sarily go against the basic social relationship repertoire that
human and non-human primates would have at their dis-
posal. This is what the following pages are going to argue
about.
4.1 Cultural ‘‘Piggybacks’’
As seen above, deontic inferences proper to primitive
social relationships, as well as the deontic affordances that
the instantiations of those relationships in concrete, real-
life social interactions give rise to, are within the cognitive
reach of young infants and non-human primates. Whereas
the parsing and inferential capacities that enable social
beings to ‘‘see’’ a relationship ‘‘as’’ dominance, group
allegiance or exchange are shared by humans and other
animal species, abilities necessary for processing cultural
relationships seem to be human-specific. Indeed, the pro-
cessing of cultural relationships requires species-specific
symbolic abilities. Such symbolic abilities are necessary
for endowing, through a series of ‘‘counting-as’’, natural or
social facts (object, person, relationship) with new deontic,
culture-specific properties (Searle 1995). Status-function
assignments like ‘‘this river counts as a border’’, ‘‘this
military salute counts as an act of submissiveness’’, or ‘‘this
man counts as the president of the US’’, creates the very
possibility of new kinds of activities, roles and relation-
ships (e.g., marriage, economical exchange, political elec-
tion, etc.) (Searle 2010).
This being so, although cultural types of relationships do
result from a collective imaginative leap, they still might
‘‘piggyback’’ onto universal types of social relationships. If
it were not the case, an anthropologist who does not know
anything about the local cultural habits of the community
she wants to investigate would be completely lost. Now, far
from being lost, anthropologists demonstrate in their work
that they recognize a large amount of relational common-
alities in the field, as exotic as this latter may seem. In
order to understand the Kula system, for instance, the well-
known anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski focused first
on familiar social relationships such as economic transac-
tion, sense of reciprocity and hierarchical respect (Mali-
nowski 1922). In other words, his attention was drawn to
the strangeness of some conducts because those latter stood
out from numerous recognizable, easily processed social
relationships. To take another example from the classical
anthropological literature, what makes the institution of the
gift understandable is the relationship of reciprocal
exchange and mutual obligation that underlies it (Mauss
1968). In spite of its cultural sophistications, gift giving
and the social bond it contributes to solidify are not com-
pletely human specific; after all, the cultural ritual of giving
gifts affords reciprocated countergifts just as grooming
affords reciprocating in non-human primate forms of life.
Another good example of a continuum between the
social and the cultural is a deontic affordance such as
request. Indeed non-human primates use, in a dyadic way,
request gestures to obtain something that they want from
others, like grooming, play or mating, and continue to
gesture until they finally receive the appropriate response
(Liebal and Call 2012). Request gestures thus provide
deontic affordances that are meant to trigger others into
action. Although requests take more sophisticated forms in
human communication, they serve the same purpose:
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providing, as Carassa and Colombetti (2009) put it, a wide
range of deontic affordances that ‘‘bring about effects in
others’’. For instance, Carassa and Colombetti say, a man
asking a lady whether she would like to have a drink with
him creates a deontic affordance for her, in this case the
opportunity for her to accept the invitation and hence to
spend some time with him. In both human and non-human
communication, requests provide affordances for others to
act in a certain way.
Even abstract cultural phenomena can be integrated into
a naturalist continuum that goes from the basic require-
ments of living in social groups to the specific demands and
rules for action of the culture we live in. So a nation, even
if it involves an imaginative leap that only humans are
capable of, can be seen as a very sophisticated sociocul-
tural elaboration of the basic relationship of group mem-
bership. Of course, one must not diminish the difference
between experience-based group membership and imagi-
native, nation-like group membership. A ‘‘knowable com-
munity’’, constituted and maintained through face-to-face
interactions, greatly differs from the ‘‘imagined commu-
nity’’ that comes only into existence thanks to the certainty,
in the mind of each of its members, that they do form a
community (Anderson 1983). Still, in spite of this impor-
tant change of scale, group membership works similarly
enough in these two kinds of communities to trigger the
same deontic inferences, proper to naı̈ve sociology. For
instance, just like primates expect cooperation and coali-
tionary behavior from in-group members in case of inter-
group conflict (Muller and Mitani 2005), people who
identify others as being part of their national community
expect them to be on their side in case of international
conflict.
Although requiring an important imaginative stretch,
complex systems of cultural beliefs are also grounded in
more basic types of social relationships. For instance, the
anthropologist Favret-Saada (1977, 2009) has forcefully
demonstrated that, in the France of the 1970s, the stake of
witchcraft was nothing but the attempt, often cruel, to
reestablish the fundamental social equilibrium jeopardized
by the alleged witch. The witch was seen as a free rider,
who got rich at the expense of others and malevolently
transgressed the elementary rules of social exchange and
reciprocation necessary to hold society together (Favret-
Saada 1977, 2009; Clément 2003). Among numerous other
studies, this research shows that an important part of cul-
ture ultimately refers to high-level, culture-dependent re-
descriptions and reconfigurations of primitive types of
social relationships. The processing of this cultural reper-
toire, we suggest, is facilitated by the mastery of a mature
naı̈ve sociology that enables the understanding of complex
deontic systems of relationships such as commercial
transaction, political election, marital engagement, or
public instruction. An important function of these rights
and duties systems is indeed to establish the systems of
interdependent places (e.g., seller-buyer, president-elector,
husband-wife, teacher-student) that define the scope of
what can be uttered and done by whom in which situation.
So when the teacher speaks, students must remain silent;
when I marry you, then I have to take care of you, and so
on. Interestingly, deontic principles at the core of basic
social relationships work in the same way: they specify
how role ‘‘bearers’’ such as superior-inferior or mother–
child ought to relate to one another.
Even if social and cultural relationships have a different
degree of complexity and do not require the same cognitive
capacities to be processed, it is important to note that this
does not call into question the hypothesis of naı̈ve sociol-
ogy. Mature naı̈ve sociology does not work differently than
mature naı̈ve psychology. Indeed mature naı̈ve psychology
involves successive and diverse conceptual acquisitions,
from basic desire understanding to complex understanding
of the divine will of God (Wellman 1998). Similarly,
mature naı̈ve sociology allows the processing of more or
less complex types of relationships, from rudimentary af-
filiative and dominance relationships to institutional divi-
sion of labor. The fact that the wide range of cultural
relationships involves distinct emotional and motivational
constituents and different developmental processes does
not turn for all that mature naı̈ve sociology into a con-
ceptual umbrella for a variety of disparate, unrelated con-
cepts of relationships. Just like naı̈ve psychology, naı̈ve
sociology might be a developmental construct that broad-
ens with ontogeny and socialization but is nevertheless
grounded in a rather limited conceptual repertoire of social
relationships. Cognitive competences necessary to process
cultural relationships and to pick out the deontic affor-
dances that instantiate them in situ derive from those
enabling human and non-human primates to process their
social counterpart.
4.2 The Cultural Shaping of Affordances
If cultural relationships are built up on universal types of
social relationships, common to all human societies, it
remains to explain how cultural differences can emerge and
be maintained. The hypothesis that we would like to defend
here is that cultural differences emerge from the uneven
degree of attention granted to the social relationships that
carve the social world in a universal manner.
The salience of social characteristics, such as gender,
race, ethnicity, age, cultural membership, and social status,
varies from culture to culture (Freeman et al. 2009). A
large amount of evidence thus shows cultural variation in
the degree of salience of relationships and of their situated
instantiation in social affordances. In Japan, for instance,
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there is more affordance than in the United State to be
subordinate, as subordinate thinking and behavior is posi-
tively reinforced (Moskowitz et al. 1994). Culture can
reinforce or inhibit the deontic force of social but also
physical affordances, giving individuals the incentive to
recognize some affordances as worthy of being acted
upon or, on the contrary, as being irrelevant or meaning-
less. The attentional paths that thus implicitly restrain or
extend the individuals’ scope of possible actions, percep-
tions, and representations are at the heart of the process of
enculturation. Such process is primarily performed by the
‘‘attention-directing interactions’’ of attention holders (e.g.,
caregivers, teachers, authority figures, and so on) (Love-
land 1991: 110). To become a competent community
member, we have to learn the attentional commonalities
that mediate the perception, qualification and recognition
of saliencies, define what information is relevant in which
situation, and inhibit or encourage opportunities for action.
Whereas social affordances such as threatening faces or
request gestures can be immediately recognized, cultural
affordances require ‘‘training’’ in a given cultural envi-
ronment to be recognized and acted upon. In other words,
community members must acquire the sense of possibili-
ties, incentives, and obligations to act that characterize
their culture and learn to identify them in the layout of their
environment (e.g., deference to authority figures, meat
taboos, dress codes, etc.). For instance, in England, they
have to learn that the queen entering a room affords a given
response, in this case standing up; they must more gener-
ally learn that this deontic affordance instantiates the
abstract cultural relationship of respect and subordination
that relates the people to its queen. In the same vein, the
inhabitants of a lot of countries must learn that the flag is a
cultural affordance that affords saluting it (Windsor 2004)
because it instantiates the abstract cultural relationship of
nation membership.
Several studies in ecological psychology, cognitive
sociology and social psychology lend support to the
hypothesis that cultural differences might emerge first from
the fine-grained socialization or enculturation of attention.
The culture-dependency of the ‘‘attentional bias’’ that leads
agents to selectively attend to the relevant features of their
physical and social environments is strikingly revealed in
cross-cultural and cross-social experimental studies on
logical inference, perception, categorization and causal
analysis (Nisbett et al. 2001; Nisbett 2003). For instance,
Easterners give priority to relationship processing, back-
ground elements and holistic explanations, whereas West-
erners focus on individual properties, mentalistic
attributions and analytic thinking (Nisbett 2003). Because
of these cultural ‘lenses’, even a simple scene of fish
swimming in an aquarium is perceived differently: West-
erners are inclined to focus on the substantial, intrinsic
properties of the fish themselves (e.g., color, shape, etc.),
while East Asians tend to pay attention to the field and to
the relations between the fish and the field.
Interestingly, those different attentional pathways seem
to be explained by the specificity of the social organization
and relational form of life people live in. Indeed, farming
and fishing communities that emphasize harmonious social
interdependence exhibit greater holistic cognitive tenden-
cies in attention, categorization, and reasoning than herding
community—even if the three types of communities belong
to the same national, geographic, ethnic, and linguistic
regions, in this case the region of Turkey’s eastern Black
Sea (Uskul et al. 2008). Similarly, interdependent southern
Italians and working class people, who prompt attention to
social relationships, reason in a more holistic fashion than
relatively independent northern Italians or middle class
individuals (Knight and Nisbett 2007). These different
studies show that what is ‘‘seen as’’ relevant information
depends on the way societies are organized and orient
attention toward some aspects of the environment at the
expense of others.
This attention-directing work is particularly manifest in
the variation of cultural patterns of attention and interac-
tion. Comparing the interactions of Japanese and American
mothers with their 6, 12 and 19 months old children, Fer-
nald and Morikawa (1993) have thus shown that American
mothers use twice as many ‘‘object labels’’ (e.g., doggie,
piggie) as Japanese mothers, whereas the latter use twice as
many ‘‘social routines of politeness forms’’ (empathy,
greeting). For Nisbett (2003), these results suggest that
interactional style as well as beliefs about child rearing
strongly influence the structure and content of speech
addressed to infants and, above all, triggers culture-specific
patterns of attention. Whereas American children are
learning to be especially attentive to the place of objects,
Japanese children are learning that relationships are the
most relevant aspects of the world (Nisbett 2003).
Focusing on the attention-directing interactions of care-
givers and the attentional pathways that the physical, social
and cultural environment may afford or elicit makes cul-
tural variations less mysterious. Certain features of the
environment, as well as certain cognitive or emotional
experiences, are the constant focus of cultural attention and
are, as Levy (1973) put it, ‘‘hypercognized’’; others are, on
the contrary, ‘‘hypocognized’’, that is, virtually ignored. For
instance, in an American culture characterized by its
‘‘allergy to the past’’, regret is considered as an unhealthy,
unproductive backward-looking emotion and is ‘‘hypocog-
nized’’ to the point of disappearing from the phenomeno-
logical mindscape of American people (Landman 1996).
Just as ‘‘inattentional blindness’’ can occur, at a perceptual
level, by focused attention on some details at the expense of
others, even if ‘this detail’ is a gorilla (Simons and Chabris
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1999), inattentional blindness can also occur at other cog-
nitive levels. Attention and disattention are thus the main
workings of the enculturation process that teaches us to be
‘‘affected’’ by specific deontic affordances. As Zerubavel
(1997) suggests, individuals must learn the topology of
salience of their cultural community, whether it be the
beauty of a landscape, the similarity of sexes instead of their
differences, or the relevance of the lions in the zoo instead
of the fences. In this ‘‘optical socialization’’, the deontic
component is essential: the optical or attentional deviants
who are at odds with the saliencies commonly shared by
others around them and do not respond to public, common
affordances risk social ‘‘excommunication’’.
5 Conclusion: Intertwining Social and Natural Sciences
At a time when even biologists insist on the importance of
the social environment for understanding the evolution of
the human brain, any emphasis on an incompressible divide
between cognitive science and social science seems out-
dated. To show social scientists that cognitive sciences do
not obligatory involve a reduction of their traditional areas
of interest to mental processes, we have focused our
argument on the existence of an independent cognitive
domain dedicated to the processing of social relationships:
naı̈ve sociology.
One of the interests of our naı̈ve sociology hypothesis is
that it extends the way most cognitive scientists frame
social cognition. Indeed, the prevailing view of the social
domain consists, from an ontological point of view, of
mental states and, from a cognitive point of view, of
mindreading. This view of social cognition, we argue,
needs to be supplemented with another conception of the
social domain, characterized by a relational ontology and
responding to the deontic logic of social relationships.
Social relationships have a directive force: social beings
feel in principle committed to them, regard themselves as
obligated to abide by them, and impose them on conspe-
cifics—including third parties (Fiske 1992, 2005; Haslam
and Fiske 2004). So deontic inferences specific to naı̈ve
sociology, we claim, do not depend on theory of mind: they
constitute a cognitive domain of their own. In its elemen-
tary and universal manifestation, mostly shared with non-
human primates, as well as in its mature and cultural
reconfiguration, naı̈ve sociology allows well-adapted social
beings to grasp the constraining and enabling affordances
that are laid out in the common world ‘out there’ (deontic
affordances). Deontic affordances are not mere action
possibilities or opportunities for action but solicitations to
act. The temporal scale and cognitive impact of those
solicitations can vary since they can be either contingent on
the situated interaction (Carassa and Colombetti 2009),
dependent upon the socio-historical context, or more per-
manent and rooted in our evolutionary history (Withagen
et al. 2012). But in any cases deontic affordances can be
perceived either egocentrically for oneself or allocentri-
cally for other, encompassing thereby both the responsive
abilities of the social agent and the interpretative skills of
the social perceiver. Since they indicate what individuals
should do in which situation, deontic affordances are easily
translatable into the more generic deontic principles that
are at the core of naı̈ve sociology. They enable social
agents to infer, on their basis, the abstract patterns of
relationships that govern them (deontic inferences). To sum
up, naı̈ve sociology enables anyone, but in particular
newcomers to a social group such as children or immi-
grants, to rapidly identify social and cultural relationships
as well as the deontic affordances that characterize their
instantiation in concrete chains of interactions.
Another interest of our naı̈ve sociology hypothesis is
that it involves a model of the mind that has plausible
correlates in the mental processes described by psycholo-
gists and cognitive scientists. Currently, indeed, the meta-
theoretical assumptions on the social nature of the human
mind that underlie the prevailing approaches in the social
sciences are rarely transformed into an empirical enquiry.
Such empirical investigation can force social theorists to
be, at last, realistic about the mental (Kaufmann 2011). The
human mind, even if it requires a cultural scaffolding to
participate in ordinary social life, is far from the ‘‘blank
slate’’ that most models of the social sciences take for
granted (Pinker 2002). The mind is endowed with a cog-
nitive equipment, socially ‘‘in-formed’’, that demonstrates
that mind and society are not inversely proportional. Sci-
entists, whether they be cognitive or social scientists, do
not have to choose between the internal foundations and
the external features of the social. A social behavior is by
definition the joint co-product of cognitive and social
processes. As the philosopher Dretske (1988) put it, the
behavior of an individual is provoked by a ‘‘triggering
cause’’, necessarily proximate and cognitively instantiated,
which is immediately responsible for its occurrence (e.g.,
Clyde stood up because he saw the queen enter the room).
If cognitive scientists can pinpoint what causes this par-
ticular individual to do x rather than y, they still need the
help of social scientists to describe the ‘‘structuring cau-
ses’’, that is, the distal phenomena that have shaped or
structured the behavioral process as a whole (e.g., Clyde
stood up as a gesture of respect) (Dretske 1988: 43–45). As
far as acculturated animals like humans are concerned,
many of these structuring causes are extrinsic to the indi-
vidual and social in nature. We have suggested that those
social causes can influence individual behaviors through
the numerous deontic affordances to which our cognitive
system is particularly sensitive.
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Of course, there is much work to be done in the future to
better specify naı̈ve sociology. First of all, further research
is needed to identify the different kinds of social relation-
ships that furnish the human and non-human worlds. In
order to do so, a cognitive approach, focused on the
identification of the internal processes that enable us to
adjust to the social world, needs to be supplemented with a
sociological approach, centered on the external description
of canonical social and cultural relationships. Such a
sociological approach would greatly benefit from obser-
vational techniques of ethologists, which combine natu-
ralist concern and descriptive sharpness (Altmann 1974;
Zuberbühler and Wittig 2011). In parallel, standard
experimental methodologies developed by cognitive sci-
entists are needed to understand how social relationships
and deontic affordances might be cognitively recognized
and recruited. One important issue would be to highlight,
mainly thanks to developmental psychology, the relation-
ship between naı̈ve sociology and naı̈ve psychology, as
they would be the two main domains of social cognition.
More and more studies seem to indicate that young infants
develop expectancies about the behaviors of people
involved in specific kinds of relationship such as domi-
nance (Mascaro and Csibra 2012). But it still remains to
find the ‘‘acid test’’ that would prove that deontic affor-
dances and inferences proper to naı̈ve sociology take a
cognitive pathway different from that of naı̈ve psychology.
Last but not least, we have argued that culture comes
mostly to the mind in the form of the attentional paths that
implicitly restrain or extend the scope of possible actions
and perceptions. We have also argued that social and cul-
tural relationships can be integrated into a naturalist con-
tinuum that indicate what can and should be done. But both
arguments are underlain by an important distinction,
remained implicit until now, which needs to be high-
lighted: the distinction, too often left aside in the social
sciences, between the social and the cultural. Even if the
social and the cultural might be difficult to pull apart in
empirical, particular social situations, their distinction must
be analytically maintained because they do not have the
same phylogenetic, and probably ontogenetic, history.
Whereas elementary forms of sociality are found in non-
human societies, cultural relationships are artificial, ‘‘lin-
guistically infected’’ and therefore human-specific. Culture
presupposes the existence of the social, but the reverse is
not true: a culture consists of shared representations and
practices whose maintenance through time requires pre-
existing social relationships that structure their circulation
and transmission (Kroeber and Parsons 1958; Kaufmann
and Clément 2003; Schaeffer 2007). In other words, cul-
tural relationships are grounded in social relationships but
it does not work the other way around.
This does not mean that culture does not have funda-
mental implications for social life, even when it refers to
symbolic, non-perceptible entities. Indeed, at first glance,
symbolic representations such as the Holy Trinity seem
difficult to apprehend within a naturalist framework. Sep-
arated by a huge gap from basic social forms of life, they
are neither reducible to the oriented screening of preex-
isting social affordances, nor to the creation of new readily
perceptible opportunities for action. Yet symbolic repre-
sentations have a deontic force that enables them to operate
as ‘social glue’. The ‘‘contractual intangibles’’ proper to
culture, such as spirits, divinities, laws or nations, have a
strong impact on social integration and cooperation by
promoting moral cohesion and collective allegiance
(Dunbar et al. 1999).
In other words, symbolic representations have a
‘‘togetherness effect’’: they trigger a participative stance
that allows individuals to go beyond their own narrow
sphere of experience to better reach the sphere of the col-
lective imagination. This participative stance leads the
individuals to enter an imaginary world that provides them
with new opportunities of action and can, in fine, transform
their existence. However, such a stance does not override
the natural inclinations of our basic social mind: it rather
extends them to cultural entities whose deontic force needs
to be highlighted by both social and cognitive sciences.
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Dezecache G, Conty L, Grèzes J (2013) Social affordances: is the
mirror neuron system involved? Commentary on target article of
Schilbach and colleagues. Behav Brain Sci 36(4):417–418
Diesendruck G, Eldror E (2011) What children infer from social
categories. Cogn Dev 26(2):118–126
Dilthey W (1883/1999) Critique de la raison historique: introduction
aux sciences de l’esprit et autres textes. Cerf, Paris
Dokic J (2010) Affordances and the sense of joint agency. In: Balconi
M (ed) Neuropsychology of the sense of agency. Springer,
Milan, pp 23–43
Dretske F (1988) Explaining behavior: reasons in a world of causes.
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Dunbar RIM (2003) Evolution of the social brain. Science
302(5648):1160–1161
Dunbar R, Knight C, Power C (eds) (1999) The evolution of culture:
an interdisciplinary view. Edinburgh University Press, Edin-
burgh, pp 1–11
Dunham Y, Baron AS, Banaji MR (2008) The development of
implicit intergroup cognition. Trends Cogn Sci 12:248–253
Durkheim E (1991) [1912] Les formes élémentaires de la vie
religieuse. Librairie Générale Française, Paris
Favret-Saada J (1977) Les Mots, la mort, les sorts: la sorcellerie dans
le bocage. Gallimard, Paris
Favret-Saada J (2009) Désorceler. L’Olivier, Paris
Fernald A, Morikawa H (1993) Common themes and cultural
variations in Japanese and American mothers’ speech to infants.
Child Dev 64:637–656
Fiske AP (1992) The four elementary forms of sociality: framework for
a unified theory of social relations. Psychol Rev 99(4):689–723
Fiske AP (2005) Social relations: culture, development, natural
selection, cognition, the brain, and pathology. In: Van Lange
PAM (ed) Bridging social psychology: the benefits of transdis-
ciplinary approaches. Erlbaum, Mahwah, pp 293–300
Fiske AP, Fiske ST (2007) Social relationships in our species and
cultures. In: Kitayama S, Cohen D (eds) Handbook of cultural
psychology, Guilford, New York, pp 283–306
Flack JC, Jeannotte LA, de Waal FBM (2004) Play signaling and the
perception of social rules by juvenile chimpanzees (pan troglo-
dytes). J Comp Psychol 118(2):149–150
Freeman JB, Rule NO, Adams RB, Ambady N (2009) Culture shapes
a mesolimbic response to signals of dominance and subordina-
tion that associates with behavior. Neuroimage 47:353–359
Gärdenfors P (1996) Cued and detached representations in animal
cognition. Behav Process 36:263–273
Garfinkel H (1967) Studies in ethnomethodology. Prentice-Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, NJ
Gelman R, Williams EM (1998) Enabling constraints for cognitive
development and learning: domain specificity and epigenesis. In:
Kuhn D, Siegler RS (eds) Handbook of child psychology, vol II,
5th edn. Wiley, New York, pp 575–630
Gibson J (1979) The ecological approach to visual perception.
Houghton Mifflin, Boston
Ginsborg H (2011) Primitive normativity and skepticism about rules.
J Philos 108(5):227–254
Goldie P (2007) Seeing what is the kind thing to do: perception and
emotion in morality. Dialectica 61(3):347–361
Good JM (2007) The affordances for social psychology of the
ecological approach to social knowing. Theory Psychol
17:265–295
Grosenick L, Clement TS, Fernald RD (2007) Fish can infer social
rank by observation alone. Nature 445:429–432
Hacking I (1999) The social construction of what?. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge Mass
Harris PL (2000) The work of the imagination. Blackwell, Oxford
Harris PL (2006) Social cognition. In: Damon W, Lerner RM, Kuhn
D, Siegler R (eds) Handbook of child psychology, vol 2, 6th edn.
New York, Wiley, pp 811–856
Haslam N (ed) (2004) Relational models theory: a contemporary
overview. Lawrence Erlbaum, NJ
Haslam N, Fiske AP (2004) Social expertise: theory of mind or theory
of relationships? In: Haslam N (ed) Relational models theory: a
contemporary overview. Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ, pp 147–163
Hauser MD, Marler P (1993) Food-associated calls in rhesus
macaques (Macaca mulatta): II. Costs and benefits of call
production and suppression. Behav Ecol 4:206–212
Havelange V (1998) Le social en débat: cognition ou interprétation.
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